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Introduction 
In his Budget speech on 19 March 2014, the Chancellor announced the biggest change in pension 
poliĐy iŶ ϭϬϬ years: ͚Pensioners will have complete freedom to draw down as much or as little of 
their pension pot as they want, any time they want. No caps. No drawdown limit. Let me be clear. 
No one will haǀe to ďuy aŶ aŶŶuity … People ǁho haǀe ǁorked hard aŶd saǀed hard all their liǀes, 
and done the right thing, should be trusted ǁith their oǁŶ fiŶaŶĐes͛. 
There was widespread approval of this policy change.  Typical is the following: 
…For ŵost people the issue isn't about irresponsible spending - they'll want to try to make 
their pension pot last their remaining lifetime - it's about knowing how much they can safely 
spend each year without their pot running out. This depends on a number of variables - 
where they invest, the pattern of investment returns, charges, inflation, how long they live 
etc…. 
…Not oŶly will it eŶcourage people to opeŶ their eyes to other retireŵeŶt iŶcoŵe optioŶs, 
which have actually been there for some time, it may also incentivise greater retirement 
saving overall since people will have a greater feeling of control over their money. This is 
great for the industry and savers alike. 
 
Everybody wins. 
(Why pensioners won't buy that Lamborghini, by Colin Bell, product director at Aegon 
Ireland, Professional Adviser, 8 April 2014) 
The implication of this is that a few variables - where they invest, the pattern of investment returns, 
charges, inflation, how long they live, etc - can be reliably estimated and so there is no need to buy 
an annuity in retirement.   
But how long someone lives cannot be reliably estimated unless they have a terminal condition.  
Figure 1 shows that in advanced countries, life expectancy has been increasing at the rate of 
approximately 2 years per decade since 1840. But being told their life expectancy, as the Pensions 
Minister promises to do, is a completely useless piece of information for someone who has just 
retired, since there is an approximately 50% chance that a 65-year old man will live beyond his life 
expectancy of 86.7 years as the left Đhart iŶ Figure Ϯ shoǁs.  It doesŶ͛t get easier at higher ages.  
Telling an 85-year old man that his life expectancy is 91.6 years is also of little use, since one-in-three 
85-year old men will reach 93 and 5% will reach 100 as the right chart in Figure 2 shows.   
Further, individuals are notoriously bad at estimating their own life expectancy. Figure 3 reveals that 
all age groups – and men more than women – significantly underestimate their own life expectancy.  
The extent of the underestimation decreases with age, but men in their 60s underestimate by an 
average of five years and women by three.  So if a retiree plans to draw down their pension fund in 
line with their own estimate of their life expectancy, a typical male will outlive their pension pot by 
five years and a typical female by three. 
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One might assume that the government would be better at estimating life expectancy than 
individuals.  Unfortunately this is not the case. The official agency for estimating life expectancy in 
the UK is the Office for National Statistics.  Figure 4 indicates that the ONS has systematically and 
significantly underestimated the increase in life expectancy since 1971. 
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Even if we could improve our forecasts of the trend improvement in life expectancy, there will 
always be considerable uncertainty around the trend. The longevity fan chart in Figure 5 shows that 
the best estimate of male life expectancy at age 65 in 2060 is 26 years, but it could be anywhere 
from 22 years to 28 years, a range of 6 years. There seems to be little point in telling a 20-year old 
male that his life expectancy could be anywhere between 87 and 93 years. 
 
The information contained in Figures 1 to 5 is clearly not well understood at the Treasury.  It is also 
not well understood within much of the pensions industry.  Certainly it is not understood by those 
who agree with the Chancellor that individuals ͚should be trusted with their own finances͛ siŶĐe they 
haǀe Ŷo iŶteŶtioŶ of eŶgagiŶg iŶ ͚irrespoŶsiďle speŶdiŶg͛.   This is nothing to do with irresponsibility 
and everything to do with the flawed proposal that longevity is a risk that individuals can both 
understand and manage themselves.  
What the Chancellor proposes, therefore, is to transfer longevity risk (both trend and idiosyncratic) 
from a collective pooled system (insurance) to individual retail customers (DC scheme members). As 
members of DC schemes, they already bear all the risks in the accumulation phase: contribution risk, 
investment risk, and interest rate risk. They now have to face all the risks in the decumulation stage:  
inflation risk as well as longevity risk.  These risks were collectively too big for private sector UK 
employers to bear which is why they have closed down their defined benefit schemes.  
It seems that the Chancellor has forgotten the definition of a pension scheme which is to provide 
retirement income security for however long the scheme member lives. For DC, there is only one 
financial instrument ever devised that provides this security – the lifetime annuity. This is why the  
use of a lifetime annuity is an essential component of a well-designed DC plan at some point during 
decumulation. Yet the Chancellor has just decided that annuities are not necessary. 
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Lifetime annuities are by far the greatest single financial innovation of all time.  The fact that a group 
of people can pool their pension pots and each one can draw an income for however long they live is 
truly remarkable.  Just as remarkable is the fact that this product can provide good value for money.
1
 
There is, of course, nothing to stop individual retirees from buying an annuity, but all the evidence 
indicates that, given the choice, many, if not most, ǁoŶ͛t: aŶŶuity sales have plummeted since the 
Budget.
2
  The problem is that most people do not believe that annuities provide good value for 
money. Even worse, most people think that they are unnecessary.  
This is a potentially lethal combination if people have the freedom to choice whether or not to buy 
an annuity. It͛s rather like being invited to jump out of an aircraft at 30,000 feet and being told that 
you now have the freedom to choose whether or not to use a parachute. Choosing not to annuitise 
is fundamentally no different from choosing not to wear a parachute. But few people see this. 
We should be under no illusions.  The ending of the requirement to annuitise at some stage means 
the effective end of private sector pensions in the UK. A pension scheme without a lifetime annuity 
is not a pension scheme. So what originally were pension schemes will now become mere savings 
schemes. 
Let us now look more closely at how this monumental change will affect the various participants in 
the pensions market 
The individual perspective 
The decumulation decision – the optimal running down of assets in retirement – is extremely 
complex. It involves not only pension assets, but also non-pension assets and decisions have to be 
made about inheritance, taxation and long term care etc. If mistakes are made and the assets are 
invested unwisely or spent too quickly, retired people do not generally have the option to re-enter 
the labour market to earn some more money in the way that younger people do. Further, these 
decisions might have to be made in presence of reduced mental capacity, as is the case with 
someone with dementia.  
I like to use the analogy of an aircraft journey. The ascent stage is equivalent to the accumulation 
stage of a pension scheme and the descent stage is equivalent to the decumulation stage. Getting a 
plane to take off is easy. Getting it to land safely in the right place at the right time is an order of 
                                                          
1
 Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks (2009) MoŶey’s Worth of PeŶsioŶ AŶŶuities, DWP Research Report No. 563; 
Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks (2008) Annuity Markets, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
2
 The Pensions Policy Institute identifies a number of countries where the voluntary purchase of annuities is 
high. In Switzerland, the annuitisation level is around 80% and this is put down to cultural attitudes with 
͚financially conservative͛ Swiss workers ͚preferring guaranteed incomes for life͛. In Chile, 70% of DC assets are 
annuitised and this is explained by the high charges on drawdown products.  Annuitisation levels are also high 
in Singapore and Denmark and this is put down to the fact the decision about whether to annuitise has to be 
made at a relatively young age, at 55 in the case of Singapore and even earlier in the accumulation phase in 
Denmark.  Israel͛s high level of annuitisation is explained by high annuity rates that are subsidised by 
government bonds.   (Pensions Policy Institute (2014) Freedom and Choice in Pensions: Comparing 
International Retirement Systems and the Role of Annuitisation, PPI Briefing Note No. 66, May 2014). 
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magnitude a more complex problem. The same is true of a pension scheme. Starting a pension 
scheme is easy compared with task of making the accumulated savings last as long as you do.
 3
  
Yet look at the effort this country put into getting 9 million lower paid workers to start a pension 
scheme, sumŵarised ďy the ǁord ͚auto-enrolŵeŶt͛. Let us reŵeŵďer hoǁ auto-enrolment works. It 
is wholly dependent on the most powerful behavioural trait - member inertia: inertia over whether 
to join the pension scheme, inertia over the contribution rate, inertia over the investment strategy.  
Relying on inertia was universally accepted by all political parties as way to get these 9 million 
workers to join a pension scheme.  
The policy change in the Budget completely undermines the inertia principle by turning auto-
enrolled DC plan members – most of whom did not know much about their pension scheme anyway 
– into airline pilots preparing to land an aircraft containing their partner, children and grandchildren. 
Remember, we are at 30,000 feet with a plane about to begin its descent. A passenger – and all 
auto-enrolees have been passengers up until now – is goiŶg to ďe iŶǀited iŶto the pilot͛s seat haǀing 
never flown a plane before and the plane has limited fuel and no parachutes. 
Not to worry, help is at haŶd iŶ the forŵ of ͚adǀiĐe͛, or should I say ͚guidaŶĐe͛. The pilot is going to 
get a single piece of ͚advice/guidance͛ at the moment they sit down iŶ the pilot͛s seat and then they 
are on their own without any further help. And there are 400,000 Ŷeǁly ͚adǀised/guided͛ pilots per 
year in the UK in this position. What could possibly go wrong? 
The decumulation stage used to be fairly simple. You retired, took a 25% tax-free lump sum and 
handed the rest of the pension pot to an insurance company in exchange for an annuity. Then it 
started to get more complicated – you could delay the annuity purchase until age 75 and use income 
drawdown before then. As mentioned, uŶder the ChaŶĐellor͛s proposals, the decumulation 
landscape will become hugely complicated for individuals in relation to the issues of investment, 
inflation, longevity, taxation, non-pension assets, inheritance and long-term care.   
One of the most important things to recognise is that the alternatives to annuitisation – principally 
income drawdown – involve more risk. People can only get a higher return than an annuity by taking 
on more risk and the extra return is not guaranteed.  Almost immediately after the Budget, scheme 
members were being encouraged to take on more risk.
4
 Drawdown also has higher charges – anyone 
who believes that annuities are expensive should ask themselves whether the 2-4% annual charge 
on drawdown represents good value for money.
5,6
 
                                                          
3
 David Blake, Andrew Cairns, and Kevin Dowd (2009) Designing a Defined-Contribution Plan: What to Learn 
from Aircraft Designers, Financial Analysts Journal, 65(1), 37-42. 
 
4
 Savers should consider taking more risk with their pensions in light of new government rules, by Chris Torney, 
express.co.uk, 23 April 2014.  
 
5
 These are just the visible costs. There are also the hidden costs of investment management which reduce the 
net returns to savers and these can be larger than the visible costs: see David Blake (2014), On the Disclosure 
of the Costs of Investment Management, Pensions Institute Discussion Paper PI-1407, May 2014. 
(http://www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp1407.pdf). 
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 Australia is often put forward as an example of a country with a good pension system that does not have 
mandatory annuitisation. However, the charges in Australian pension schemes are very high: see Jim Minifie 
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If people were capable of behaving rationally and were sufficiently well informed, they could 
calculate the risk-return tradeoff between an annuity and drawdown and choose which was initially 
better for them and, more important, when it was optimal to switch from drawdown to an annuity. 
But most people neither behave rationally nor have the technical skills to evaluate the risk-return 
tradeoff. People have behavioural biases which prevent them behaving rationally.  In particular, the 
emphasis on pot size rather than the income in retirement is very bad from a behavioural 
perspective. To most people a pot size of £30,000 sounds like a lot of money, but it is not when it 
has to last possibly for the next 30 years. Surely, it is better to be realistic about what the pension 
pot buys as an annual income? 
A particular advantage of an annuity is that it acts as a valuable pre-commitment device (i.e., is a 
very valuable behavioural tool). An annuity helps control spending in retirement. Many people are 
unable to control their spending. A survey by Aviva in April 2014 reveals that 61% will find it difficult 
to resist spending the pension pot. They could spend their money too quickly in retirement and be 
reduced to living on the single tier pension of £144 per week. This could involve a massive reduction 
in their standard of living and they will not even have a rainy day fund to fall back on. A more 
extreme example is people who are desperate for money at any price as Wonga and pension 
liberation cases show. 
There will also be people with the opposite set of behavioural traits, those who take excessive 
precautions and put everything into a rainy day fund and hence spend their money too slowly. Such 
people could have enjoyed a higher standard of living in their retirement had they had an annuity, 
taking comfort from the fact that next month another annuity payment will come in should they live 
that long. 
The new regime will create other distortions. The virtuous circle of a pension system is that it 
promotes savings which are transferred to investment which increases the productive capital stock 
which, in turn, increases productivity and national income. But what happens in the UK?  We are not 
interested in the productive capital stock.  We are only interested in houses.  That is our capital 
stock. So (interest only) pension mortgages will come back with the pension lump sum used to pay 
off the mortgage. In addition, vast amounts of the pension savings of this country will end up in buy-
to-let property investments.
7
 
In the light of all this, the idea that a single piece of ͚advice/guidance͛ will be adequate is clearly 
ludicrous. Nor is it clear the age at which this ͚advice/guidance͛ should take place. The reality is that 
there would need to be regular annual ͚advice/guidance͛ from age 55 if not earlier. But who is going 
to pay for this? A survey conducted by Hyman Robertson in May 2014 suggested that only 1.2% 
would be willing to pay for regular advice, while 50% said they would rely entirely on the free 
government-backed guidance. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2014), Super Sting: How to Stop Australians Paying Too Much for Superannuation, Grattan Institute Report 
No. 2014-6, April 2014. 
 
7
 The value of flats and houses in the buy-to-let market is estimated at £1.25 trillion, not far short of the £1.6 
trillion in occupational pension schemes (Richard Dyson, ͚£1,250bn: how buy-to-let is overtaking pensions͛, 
Daily Telegraph, Your Money Supplement, 31 May 2014) 
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The company perspective 
If pensions have become more complex for individuals, they have become much easier for 
companies – with one very important exception which will create long-term problems for 
businesses.  
Companies with legacy defined benefit (DB) schemes will naturally welcome the new regime. They 
will welcome and encourage DB scheme members switching via cash equivalent transfer values 
(CETVs) to the new DC regime, so they can take the cash. This will immediately remove inflation risk 
and longevity risk from their balance sheets.  For older workers with final salary schemes, these 
pension benefits could be worth hundreds of thousands of pounds if not millions (compared with 
the current £30,000 average pension pot with a DC scheme).  These are huge sums to put at risk in 
this way and the income drawdown merchants will be contacting everyone in the land.  These 
merchants might actually be encouraged to do this by the DB sĐheŵe ŵeŵďer͛s oǁŶ faŵily, newly 
aware that grand-dad suddenly has access to a million quid which could provide a very useful 
deposit for a grand-child͛s mortgage or be used for more buy-to-let properties. 8   
The exception is the reason why companies set up pension schemes in the first place. Pension 
schemes started to manage the exit of old unproductive workers from the firm – initially as a lump 
sum gratuity and later as a pension annuity.  If 55 year olds blow their pension pot, they will not be 
able to afford to retire, so the new regime takes away the ability of companies to manage the exit of 
their old workers from the labour force.  
The relationship between generations 
There is a potential massive moral hazard if one generation decides to become profligate with its 
pension wealth and goes on a big spending spree. Once it has run out of money, it will turn to the 
state and begin demanding means-tested welfare benefits.
9
 This is a fine art in Australia – a country 
with no requirement to annuitise – where they call this practice ͚douďle dippiŶg͛. SiŶĐe older people 
tend to vote in larger numbers than younger people, they will be able to put political pressure on 
politicians to raise these means-tested benefits. This, in turn, will require massive bailouts from the 
next generation of taxpayers and result in intergenerational inequity. 
Tax  
The new regime will bring forward tax revenues – the Budget forecasts for tax receipts anticipate 
this.  
                                                          
8
 This has already started. On 21 May 2014, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) began warning the public 
about offers of free pension reviews from companies claiming to act on behalf of the FCA, but in fact are not 
authorised to conduct such reviews. The FCA said it has evidence of people being contacted out of the blue via 
phone calls, emails, text messages or online adverts. The FCA said the reviews are designed to persuade 
people to move their pension pot from an existing personal or occupational pension scheme to a self-invested 
personal pension or small self-administered scheme. The pension pot is then typically invested in unregulated 
investments like overseas property developments, forestry or storage units known as store pods. 
 
9
 Under the Government͛s proposals, people in receipt of only the full single-tier pension will be able to claim 
Housing Benefit, Council Tax Reduction and other means-tested benefits. 
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But the ending of annuitisation raises fundamental questions over the role of tax relief on 
contributions and investment returns in pension schemes.  The current system of pension tax relief 
is predicated on the following principle.  Individuals are incentivised to save for a pension via tax 
relief on contributions and investment returns. In exchange for this generosity, pension scheme 
members were required to annuitise their pension pot in order to control their spending in 
retirement and not fall back on the state. At the same time, the pension would be taxed and the 
taxes received would be higher than if the tax relief on contributions and investment returns had not 
been given, by an amount that makes the system broadly neutral over the life cycle.  Now that there 
is no requirement to annuitise, the justification for providing tax relief has gone. The pension 
scheme has been turned into a mere wealth accumulation scheme. That raises a big question: why 
should tax payers pay £54 billion in tax relief on contributions to asset accumulation schemes which 
could be spent on Lamborghinis even if most people have no plans to buy one. You can still make the 
regime tax neutral, but why bother in the first place?  
There will also now be an inconsistency between the system of tax relief on the other big savings 
scheme in this country, ISAs.  With a pension scheme, contributions are tax relieved, investment 
returns are tax free, and the withdrawals are taxed. With ISAs, contributions are made from post-tax 
income, investment returns are tax free, and the withdrawals are tax free. There is no logically 
reason to retain both systems of tax relief, and it seems logical for the government to withdraw the 
most expensive one. 
Implications for regulation 
Regulators now face the same complexity in monitoring the decisions of individuals as those 
individuals have in making them.  It used to be the case that a single decision (buy an annuity) was 
made on a single day (retirement date). That made life easy for regulators since they could focus on 
what investment managers were delivering before retirement and what life assurers were delivering 
after. Then when drawdown was introduced in 1995, two decisions had to be made: annuity or 
drawdown. This increased the complexity of the regulatory regime, since, for the first time, fund 
managers were able to encroach on the territory that had previously been exclusively that of 
insurers.  But, there is now the possibility of decisions being made on any day after the age of 55. In 
addition to all this are the different regimes for contract-based and trust-based schemes. Another 
important question is who will collect and collate the data on this – the Financial Conduct Authority, 
The Pensions Regulator, or the Treasury? 
Implications for annuities 
It is already clear that the Budget changes will devastate the world's biggest annuity market. Prior to 
the Budget, approximately 400,000 annuities with total premiums of £12 billion were sold annually 
in the UK. This was more than half of all global sales.  The next biggest market is Chile with 22,000 
annual sales.  At the bottom of the list is Australia with just 30 voluntary annuities sold per year.  
Within a month of the Budget, sales of annuities have fallen by 40-50%, and could fall by 75% or 
more, according to predictions made by PwC and Legal & General. At this rate, Chile, where the 
purchase of annuities at retirement is mandatory, Đould sooŶ ďe the ǁorld͛s largest ŵarket. 
While studies have shown that the value for money of annuities sold in the open market is fairly 
high, it is also true that the internal annuities sold to its existing clients are very poor value – in many 
11 
 
cases 30% poorer than the OMO annuities. So the insurance industry was asking for trouble by 
failing to rectify this. But the government has not helped either. Quantitative Easing has had a 
material effect in driving down annuity yields. Further, the government could have helped annuity 
providers hedge the systematic longevity trend risk they face by issuing longevity bonds, but it has 
failed to do so.
10
 Solvency 2 – with its additional capital requirements - will drive down annuity yields 
even more. 
The ŵoŶey͛s ǁorth of aŶŶuities reflects the risks insurers take and the regulatory capital they are 
required to post. These risks have now been passed back to individuals.  For those individuals who 
do buy annuities in the voluntary market the value for money will now be considerably lower due to 
selection effects and lower overall sales. Further, it is likely that such annuities will be fully 
underwritten – individuals will have to answer a full medical questionnaire. This will further 
undermine the insurance pool and make the purchase of an annuity unsuitable for a healthy 65-year 
old. 
Implications for investment  
Immediately following the Budget, the shares of annuity providers fell sharply while those of 
investment managers and brokers rose sharply, reflecting the new opportunities to extract high 
charges from drawdown products. There is a real danger of another mis-selling scandal, with high-
risk high-cost investment strategies being sold to vulnerable old people. The size of the silver vote is 
so big that they will demand and get compensation for mis-selling. 
The new regime will also make investing in the accumulation stage considerably more complex. Now 
that there is no target date for retirement and that it is possible to draw funds from the pension pot 
from age 55 without being retired, it is no longer clear what de-risking now means and what future 
investment strategies such as life-style and target date now have. Proponents of target date funds 
argue that such funds have the flexibility of dealing with changes in the retirement date: members 
can simply be moved to a later target date fund if they decide to delay retirement. But I am not 
convinced that it will be that easy. Many people will have had no previous active engagement with 
their pension scheme and are unlikely to have done much forward thinking about the optimal 
investment strategy of their pension fund in the lead up to age 55 when suddenly they can access 
their fuŶd ǁithout aŶy restriĐtioŶ.  Will 55 ďeĐoŵe the default target date? Or ǁill it ďe the sĐheŵe͛s 
normal retirement date (if that exists any more)? Depending on the answer, there will be big 
differeŶĐes iŶ the tǁo target date fuŶds͛ strategiĐ asset alloĐations and hence risk-return 
configuration when the member reaches age 55.   
A great deal of work now needs to be done on the optimal design of the investment strategies in 
defined contribution pension schemes that fully integrates the accumulation and decumulation 
phases and efficiently manages all the risks outlined above. A lot of the theoretical work has already 
been done,
11
 but this now needs to be practically implemented.
12
   
                                                          
10
 David Blake, Tom Boardman, and Andrew Cairns (2014) Sharing Longevity Risk: Why Governments Should 
Issue Longevity Bonds, North American Actuarial Journal, 18(1), 258–277. 
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 David Blake, Andrew J.G. Cairns, and Kevin Dowd (2001), PensionMetrics: Stochastic Pension Plan Design 
and Value-At-Risk During the Accumulation Phase, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 29, 187–215; 
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Implications for long-term care provision 
The new regime could have a big impact on the financing of long-term care.  If people do spend all 
their money and so would pass the long-term care means test, this will increase the burden on local 
authorities if they subsequently need care. The government is aware of this possibility and is 
proposing to classify this behaviour as ͚deliberate deprivation͛ which would allow the local authority 
to refuse to pay for care. 
However, this response would appear to create a curious anomaly.  You could have two people of 
the same age with identical salaries throughout their careers.  One spent everything and had no 
savings when they retired, while the other saved for a pension and so had a decent sized pension 
pot when they retired. Suppose the person with the pension pot drew it all down and spent it. The 
former would be entitled to care, while the latter would be accused of ͚deliberate deprivation͛ and 
hence denied care. Yet both people had done exactly the same thing and spent all their income (and 
a pension is deferred income after all) before needing long-term care.  What is the local authority 
going to do – welcome the first person into a care home and allow the second person to sleep in the 
street outside the care home? 
Conclusion 
It took two years of detailed work by the Pensions Commission to create a political consensus for 
auto-enrolment, and this was followed by seven years of preparation before auto-enrolment was 
introduced.  The ending of private-sector pensions in the UK was introduced overnight without any 
consultation or any apparent examination of the evidence or the potential consequences.  It could 
turn out to be a completely reckless policy change. 
How can this be avoided? It is essential that the decumulation stage of a DC scheme is 
institutionalised in the same way that auto-enrolment has institutionalised the accumulation stage 
and taken it out of the high-charge world of retail accumulation products, such as personal pensions. 
In a similar way, economies of scale and more efficient risk sharing need to be exploited in the 
decumulation phase to enable good value drawdown products to be designed. We urgently need to 
move away from retail decumulation products like individual drawdown and retail annuities. An 
appropriate decumulation product that can be integrated into auto-enrolment might be described as 
one that: 
 Benefits from institutional design, governance, and pricing. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
David Blake, Andrew J.G. Cairns, and Kevin Dowd (2003), PensionMetrics 2: Stochastic Pension Plan Design 
During the Distribution Phase, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 33, 29–47; 
David Blake (2003), Take (Smoothed) Risks When You Are Young, Not When You Are Old: How to Get the Best 
from Your Pension Plan, IMA Journal of Management Mathematics, 14, 145–161; 
Andrew J.G. Cairns, David Blake, and Kevin Dowd (2006), ͚Stochastic Lifestyling: Optimal Dynamic Asset 
Allocation for DefiŶed CoŶtriďutioŶ PeŶsioŶ PlaŶs͛, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 30, 843–877; 
David Blake, Douglas Wright, and Yumeng Zhang (2014) Age-Dependent Investing: Optimal Funding and 
Investment Strategies in Defined Contribution Pension Plans when Members are Rational Life-Cycle Financial 
Planners, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 38, 105–124. 
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 A survey by Schroders in May 2014 indicated that 82% of pension scheme trustees would be reviewing their 
default investment strategy.   
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 Delivers a reasonably reliable income stream (i.e. with minimal fluctuations).  
 Maintains the purchasing power of the fund.  
 Offers the flexibility to purchase a life annuity at any time (or at regular predetermined 
intervals to hedge interest rate and longevity risk) 
 Is simple to understand, transparent and low-cost 
 Requires minimal consumer engagement 
 Benefits from a low-cost delivery system.13 
But whatever happens, annuities – or something very much like them – will remain an essential 
feature of a pension scheme at some stage. As Figure 6 shows, the survival credits built into annuity 
rates which increase with age means that it is not a question of if but when pensioners should 
annuitise. It might well be optimal for healthy retirees with sufficient resources to wait until they are 
in their late 70s or early 80s before annuitising.   
It will also be necessary to draw on the lessons of behavioural economics to find ways of nudging 
pension scheme members into buying annuities when the time is right.
14
  Certainly, there needs to 
be innovation in annuity design and behavioural economics suggests that capital protected or cash-
back annuities might be attractive to scheme members. 
If individuals do not have access to low-cost institutionalised decumulation products and instead 
͚ŵaŶage͛ their oǁŶ deĐuŵulatioŶ folloǁiŶg ͚adǀiĐe/guidaŶĐe͛, theŶ I would expect good 
͚adǀiĐe/guidaŶĐe͛ to stroŶgly indicate that part of the pension pot be ring fenced for later 
annuitisation (for example, via the purchase of advanced life deferred annuities
15
) and that single 
asset investments such as buy-to-let should be avoided as they do not involve good risk 
diversification.  
I am all for ͚freedom and choice in pensions͛ and people may well save more as a result of the 
Budget,
16
 but if we are not careful, the new flexibilities introduced by the Budget will lead to a huge 
pensions mis-selling scandal – and we have been there too many times before. 
                                                          
13
 These are interim recommendations from a research study being conducted at the Pensions Institute by 
Debbie Harrison and David Blake. 
14
 David Blake and Tom Boardman (2013) Spend More Today Safely: Using Behavioral Economics To Improve 
Retirement Expenditure Decisions With Speedometer Plans, Risk Management and Insurance Review, 17(1), 
83-112. 
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 Also known as longevity insurance: see Guan Gong and Anthony Webb (2010) Evaluating the Advanced Life 
Deferred Annuity: An Annuity People Might Actually Buy, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 46, 210-221. 
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 A Legal & General MoneyMood survey in May 2014 found that 44% of those aged 18-34 said they would 
save more in a pension scheme as a result of the Budget. 
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